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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 (a): 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial 
court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of the 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 (e): 
The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may 
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 
30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this 
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex 
parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after 
expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in 
accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall 
exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of 
the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(b)(2): 
The order shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to 
exceed 10 days, as the Court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the 
order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the 
party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended 
for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of 
record. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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Appellees Kurt N. Holbrook and Tracy H. Bigelow (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") hereby 
supplement the Statement of Facts provided by Defendant-Appellant West N. Holbrook 
("Defendant") as follows: 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. On November 24,1994, the B.G. Holbrook Family Trust (the "Trust") was established. 
The Trust beneficiaries included Brigham G. Holbrook ("B.G.") and Plaintiffs. R. at 4, 15. 
2. On December 27, 1999, B.G. designated Defendant as the Trust's sole trustee. R. at 6, 
57. 
3. On or about January 25, 2000 Plaintiffs filed a Complaint with the district court, in 
their capacities as beneficiaries of the Trust, alleging, among other things, that Defendant had 
violated his fiduciary duty of loyalty as Trustee of the Trust. Plaintiffs asked for damages and 
requested injunctive relief removing Defendant as Trustee. R. at 3-13. 
4. At the same time, Plaintiffs filed an application for a temporary restraining order to 
enjoin Defendant from acting as Trustee. R. at 123-124. 
5. At a hearing on January 27, 2000, counsel for Defendant told the court that a restraining 
order was unnecessary, since counsel would be supervising Defendant's actions as Trustee in the 
future. The court agreed and denied the application. R. at 144, 151-53; 174. 
6. On March 27, 2000, Plaintiffs learned that Defendant had made multiple distributions 
from the Trust totaling more than $200,000 and repeatedly failed to disclose disbursements from the 
Trust accounts to all beneficiaries. R. at 173-83. 
7. After contacting counsel for Defendant regarding Defendant's acts in breach of his 
fiduciary duties, counsel for Defendant resigned on the same day. R. at 163-164. 
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8. Fearing continued wasting of Trust assets, Plaintiffs immediately filed an application for 
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. R. at 169-333. 
9. On March 30, 2000, the district court entered a Temporary Restraining Order 
requiring, among other things, that Defendant cease acting as Trustee of the Trust and that all 
Trust assets be frozen. R. at 334. 
10. During the March 30, 2000 hearing, at the Defendant's request, this Court extended 
the TRO until April 25, 2000. Video Transcipt at 10:10:36 to 10:11:10. 
11. On April 19, 2000, pursuant to a stipulated order for expedited discovery, Defendant 
produced, through his counsel, information concerning the Trust accounts held at Fidelity 
Investments. Included in the information was a statement for Fidelity account number X29-137200. 
The statement indicated a balance as of March 31, 2000 of $440,700.73. R. at 489-93. 
12. On April 25, 2000 the district court extended the TRO again, until May 2, 2000 when 
the ruling on Plaintiffs Application for Preliminary Injunction was scheduled to issue. R. at 414-
17. 
13. On May 2, 2000 the district court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs' Application for 
Preliminary Injunction and removed Defendant as Trustee of the Trust. R. at 418. 
14. On June 23, 2000 Plaintiffs learned that the balance of Fidelity account number X29-
137200 was less than one thousand dollars. On that day, Plaintiffs issued a subpoena of Fidelity 
account records for the Trust. R. at 446-47. 
15. On or about August 11, 2000 Plaintiffs' brought an Order to Show Cause against 
Defendant for violating this Court's March 30, 2000 Temporary Restraining Order, May 2, 2000 
ruling and June 19, 2000 Order. R. at 733-912. 
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16. The motion for order to show cause was heard on September 8, 2000. R. at 1120. 
17. At the conclusion of the September 8, 2000 hearing, this Court found that Defendant 
initiated over 100 separate transactions, trades or transfers in or from the B. G. Holbrook Family 
Trust account from March 30, 2000 to on or about May 31, 2000. R. at 1120. 
18. The court also found that each of the over 100 trades was a separate and distinct act of 
contempt to be punished separately and ordered the Defendant to serve 365 consecutive days in 
the Salt Lake County jail. R. at 1120. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case nearly defies description. Defendant-Appellant West N. Holbrook 
("Defendant"), the appointed trustee of the B.G. Holbrook Family Trust ('Trust"), not 
only breached his fiduciary duty to the Trust by wasting Trust assets, he squandered over 
$500,000 held in Trust in flagrant violation of a temporary restraining order freezing 
Trust assets and forbidding him from acting as Trustee. After finding that Defendant had 
committed more than 150 different violations of the TRO and repeatedly lied to the court, 
the district court found Defendant in contempt for at least 13 violations of the TRO and 
sentenced Defendant to one year in jail by consecutive 30-day sentences. Amazingly, 
Defendant is appealing his contempt sentence. He first disputes the procedure of the 
TRO hearing, despite the fact that he has never appealed the TRO and the time for appeal 
is long past due. He further argues that there was insufficient evidence that HE 
committed the contempt violations, despite the clear transactional record and his later 
admissions. Finally, he argues that the district court was unable to order consecutive 
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sentences for his contempt violations, although such is plainly in accord with Utah law. 
Defendant's latest crack at circumventing the law, like his other attempts, should be 
rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WAS NOT APPEALED AND 
IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THIS COURT 
In his appeal, Defendant seeks to challenge the trial court's Temporary Restraining 
Order, which was issued following a hearing on March 30, 2000. Defendant asserts that 
because his former counsel withdrew shortly before the hearing, the trial court committed 
plain error in issuing the Order instead of delaying proceedings for twenty days pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36 and Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-506. It 
is true that Defendant had the right to contest the court's Order for any number of 
reasons. However, Defendant has never appealed that Order, has never asked for an 
extension of time to appeal that Order, and cannot appeal that Order now. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that appeals from a 
final judgment and order "shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Rule 4(e) permits the 
trial court, "upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, [to] extend the time for 
filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of 
the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule." Thus, the Rules provided Defendant 
with two 30-day periods in which to protest the court's March 30, 2000 Order. However, 
Defendant never appealed the court's Order, let alone within the time periods allotted in 
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the Rules. The only appeal made by Defendant—the instant appeal from the order 
finding Defendant in contempt—was filed in November 2000, well beyond the 
permissible period. 
Even if the issue were timely and relevant to the Order appealed, Defendant's 
failure to raise the issue previously is fatal to his claim. This court has frequently stated: 
"Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding [the 
appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal." Tebbs Family Partnership v. 
Rex, 2001 WL 312387, No. 990681-CA (Utah Ct. App. March 15, 2001) (quoting Hartv. 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Because the trial court's Order of March 30, 2000 was not appealed, timely or 
otherwise, and was not raised in the trial court, it is not properly before this court, and 
thus Defendant's first argument must be disregarded. 
However, even if Defendant's contention were timely and properly noticed, the 
trial court was permitted under UCJA 4-506 to deviate from the 20-day delay. That Rule 
declares: "No further proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days have elapsed . . . 
unless otherwise ordered by the court" In this case, the trial court ordered the hearing to 
proceed in view of the exigent circumstances of the case. Counsel for Defendant had 
avoided a prior TRO on the understanding that counsel would supervise Defendant in his 
administration of the trust funds. Upon discovering that Defendant was carelessly 
depleting the trust fund of tens of thousands of dollars in margin trading, counsel 
withdrew. Defendant was making such trades almost daily. If the court had further 
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delayed the TRO hearing, substantial additional harm would have occurred to the trust. 
In those extreme circumstances, the trial court was justified in temporarily restraining 
Defendant's administration of trust funds. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court in Sperry v. 
Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984), which Defendant cites, declared that "in certain 
instances, trial courts have the inherent power to waive compliance with their own rules," 
so long as "some reason [is] suggested . . . why there should have been a waiver." Id. at 
582. The trial court clearly saw such a reason, and such has been reiterated here. Finally, 
this court has previously excused "a technical violation of Rule 4-506(1)" where such 
was insufficient to show excusable neglect or an irregularity in the proceedings. Rex, 
2001 WL 312387 at *3. This appellate allowance of waiving delay is especially 
important in the context of temporary restraining orders, which by their nature require 
immediate action. Were it otherwise, TRO defendants could avoid restraint and do 
substantial harm by simply allowing or effecting their attorneys' withdrawal. 
Thus, this court should reject Defendant's first argument as not timely appealed, 
not properly noticed, not a proper subject on appeal, waived as not previously raised, and 
substantively meritless. 
IL THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER REMAINED IN FULL 
FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL MAY 2, 2000 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are clear: a Temporary Restraining Order may 
be extended for longer than 10 days if the party against whom the order is directed 
consents to such an extension. Rule 65A specifically provides as follows: 
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The order shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to 
exceed 10 days, as the Court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the 
order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the 
party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended 
for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of 
record. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 65A(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
In their moving papers and proposed order, Plaintiffs requested only that the TRO 
remain in place for 10 days or upon a hearing for Preliminary Injunction whichever was 
sooner. The district court extended the period of the Temporary Restraining Order, at the 
request of Defendant, during the TRO hearing on March 30, 2000. Both B.G. Holbrook 
and the Defendant requested that the date for the Preliminary Injunction hearing be 
postponed to a date well beyond the expiration of the 10 days. After some discussion 
with counsel for B. G. Holbrook regarding an extension, the following exchange took 
place between Judge Medley and Defendant. 
Judge Medley: "Mr. Holbrook, are you understanding this discussion?" 
Defendant: "Yeah, I would appreciate it if you could push it [the hearing 
for Preliminary Injunction] back a little bit so I have time 
enough by, I could get new counsel." 
Judge Medley: "You understand though the further I push it back that this 
temporary order will remain in place until that [Preliminary 
Injunction] hearing is conducted and a decision is rendered. 
That's the other side of the equation." 
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Video Transcript at 10:10:36 to 10:11:10.] Notwithstanding the above exchange, 
Defendant requested and received a postponed hearing date for the Preliminary 
Injunction and voluntarily consented to extend the TRO. 
Contrary to the assertion of Defendant in his Brief, the TRO was extended, 
pursuant to Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the extension is 
not noted in the written Temporary Restraining Order, Rule 65 A only requires that any 
basis for the extension be entered of record. The basis for extension of the TRO— 
namely, Defendant's expressed request—is entered of record.2 Moreover, the 
understanding of the Court and parties was further evidenced at the conclusion of the 
April 25, 2000 Preliminary Injunction Hearing when this Court again extended the TRO 
until May 2, 2000, the date a ruling on the Application for Preliminary Injunction was 
scheduled to issue/ Accordingly, the TRO was in foil force and effect until May 2, 2000, 
based on the request and consent of the Defendant and in compliance with Rule 65 A. 
III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE 
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE SENTENCE IMPOSED 
The Fidelity documents that evidence the more than 100 transactions initiated by 
Defendant during his administration as trustee and subsequent to his removal therefrom, 
1
 Plaintiffs currently possess only a video transcript of the hearing and necessarily cite to the times 
indicated on the video. 
2
 While a written transcript of the video is not currently before the court, Defendant does not dispute its existence or 
verity. Moreover, any error in presenting the transcript in the record on appeal is largely the result of Defendant's 
delay of eight months from the date of filing its notice of appeal until his appellate brief was filed. 
3
 At the conclusion of the April 25, 2000 Preliminary Injunction hearing, Judge Medley stated, 'That 
[Temporary Restraining] Order presently in place will remain in place until I've ruled, which will be the 
second of May at 1:30." Video Transcript of April 25, 2000 Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 2:25:44 
to 2:25:53. 
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were entered in evidence as part of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 during the Order to Show Cause 
hearing. Defendant stipulated as to the admissibility of the Fidelity documents for all 
purposes and Defendant was questioned extensively regarding the transactions evidenced 
in the Fidelity documents. Ultimately, this Court found that each of the over 100 
transactions evidenced in the Fidelity documents constituted separate and distinct acts of 
contempt to be separately punished. As a result, there is no need to speculate, as 
Defendant does in his Brief, regarding when these transactions occurred and whether 
such transactions occurred during the time the TRO was in place. The evidence entered 
in this Court speaks for itself. The Fidelity documents identify the date and nature of 
each transaction initiated by Defendant. Accordingly, by referring to the Fidelity 
documents, one can quickly determine that Defendant initiated 154 transactions between 
March 31, 2000 and May 2, 2000. In short, Defendant's argument that there is 
insufficient factual evidence to determine which of the over 100 transactions occurred 
during the time the TRO was in place is without merit. 
In addition, even if the trial court had considered only the transactions that took 
place between March 31st and April 9th, during which Defendant concedes the written 
TRO was in place, a documented 52 trades took place. Each trade constituted a separate 
act of contempt. The trial court's contempt ruling required only 13 trades for the one-
year contempt sentence it issued, and there were more than enough for its determination. 
It is important to reiterate that the parties stipulated to the authenticity and relevance of 
the Fidelity documents. The Fidelity documents clearly show the number of trades that 
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occurred on each day involving the trust fund accounts. In this instance, the stipulated 
Record speaks for itself. 
Despite the clarity of the Fidelity documents, Defendant conjures up the novel 
contention that the "settlement dates" carefully noted on the documents do not clarify 
when the trades actually took place. Appellant's Brief at 23-25. The argument is 
specious; trades are generally "settled" within a few hours of being "made," and 
Defendant's attempt to distinguish between the two is disingenuous and wholly 
unavailing. This is especially true in light of the fact that 54 trades that took place during 
the initial TRO period and 157 trades within the extended time. Thus, quibbling over the 
precise "settlement date" is rendered meaningless. 
Defendant also attempts to argue that the evidence was insufficient to show that he 
made the trades that depleted over hundreds of thousands of dollars from Trust accounts. 
Thus, although Defendant admitted that he alone controlled the accounts where trading 
took place, and that only he was authorized to initiate trades, he now contends that it was 
not proven that he actually made the trades himself. 
Defendant was clearly the author of the trades in violation of the court's order. 
Defendant was the sole trustee of the B.G. Holbrook Familiy Trust. Defendant was the 
only one authorized to make trades on the account. Defendant admitted at the contempt 
hearing that trades had been made on the account in violation of the TRO. R. at 1120 
(Tr. 67-67). Moreover, Defendant took full responsibility for the transactions, but argued 
that such transactions should be considered as a "course of conduct" instead of separate 
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and distinct violations of the Court's TRO. Even in his Brief on appeal, Defendant states 
that "what he did involved a course of conduct, not separate acts." App. Brief at 27 
(emphasis added). By both Defendant's statements and the plain evidence at hearing, 
Defendant was identified as the perpetrator of the trades for the account he controlled. 
This court does not require an impassioned confession to affirm the obvious. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT HAD THE DISCRETION TO TREAT SEPARATE 
ACTS OF VIOLATION AS SEPARATE INSTANCES OF CONTEMPT TO 
BE PUNISHED SEPARATELY 
Defendant asserts that each of the 157 transactions he initiated in the Fidelity Trust 
account in violation of this Court's March 30, 2000 Order, should be considered as a 
single act of contempt or "course of conduct" for the purpose of determining an 
appropriate penalty under U.C.A. §78-32-10 (2000). In short, the Defendant argues that 
he has committed only one act of contempt and should be subject to a maximum penalty 
of a $1000 fine and 30 days in jail. As is described more fully below, neither Utah law 
nor the law cited by Defendant supports such a conclusion. 
It is within this Court's discretion to consider each of the 154 acts enumerated in 
the Plaintiffs' moving papers and set forth at the September 8, 2000 hearing as separate 
incidents of contempt. In fact, the case cited by Defendant, Department of Registration v. 
Stone, 587 P.2d 137 (Utah 1978), supports this conclusion. Specifically, the Stone court 
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held that "a sentencing judge has discretion to treat separate acts of violation as separate 
instances of contempt to be separately punished." Stone, 587 P.2d at 138. 
The Stone court went on to hold that the particular Defendant in that case could 
not be sentenced for each of the 120 separate violations of the Court's order, because the 
Motion for Order to Show Cause and supporting documents failed to individually set 
forth the 120 violations, charging instead, a "course of conduct." Stone, 587 P.2d at 139. 
The court stated that the "dimensions of the punishment" must be within the "reasonable 
contemplation of the accused" in the moving papers. Id. It was the failure of the 
Plaintiffs to separately charge the 120 violations that caused the Court to rule that the 
Defendant could not be sentenced separately for each violation. Id. 
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs clearly enumerated 291 instances of contempt and 
154 instances of contempt specifically involving the B.G. Holbrook Family Trust account 
at Fidelity Investments. These instances were individually set forth in the Memorandum 
in Support and the hearing and documented by the account statements from Fidelity 
Investments that were attached to Plaintiffs' moving papers and entered in evidence at the 
hearing. The charges were clearly within Defendant's "reasonable contemplation." Id. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the decision in Stone, this Court "has discretion to treat [the 
4
 In making its ruling, the Stone court refers to seven cases from five jurisdictions which hold that a sentencing 
judge has discretion to treat separate acts of violation as separate instances of contempt to be separately punished. 
The high court then specifically cites Ex Parte Genecov, 186 S.W.2d 225 (Texas 1945) (upholding separate 
punishment for 36 separate acts of discharging a pollutant into a river, as 36 separate acts of contempt). Texas 
courts have repeatedly ruled consistently with Genecov. No other Utah cases address this specific issue. 
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154] separate acts of violation as separate instances of contempt to be separately 
punished." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court deny 
Defendant's Appeal of the District Court's Order of October 2, 2000. 
1 0 / U N -
DATED this JL **- day of Octoter, 2001. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
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14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES was mailed, postage prepaid, on this &£ day of November, 2001 to the 
following: 
James A. Mclntyre 
Richard R. Golden 
Mclntyre & Golden 
360 East 450 South, #3 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
617359 
15 
